Secure, Private Proofs of Location
Report ID: TR-667-03Author: Waters, Brent R. / Felten, Edward W.
Date: 2003-01-00
Pages: 11
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Abstract:
We present the design of a system that can securely prove the location of a mobile device. In our system the device attempts to prove its location to a party known as the Verifier using a local network. We designed a protocol that securely measures the proximity of the device to the local network. We accomplish this by securely measuring the round-trip signal propagation latency. This technique protects the protocol from powerful attacks by an adversary. The protocol maintains the identity of the device and Verifier as private. We believe we are the first to design a location-proving system that offers both integrity and privacy. Additionally, we provide a solution to deciding which local networks are suitable for location proving. Finally, we show how our basic protocol can be adapted to securely prove the exact position of a tamper-resistant device even when the device is in the possession of an adversary.