Building a secure system is a complex and error-prone process in computing. System designers and developers face many challenges:
What does it mean for a system to be secure?
How do I know whether my system is secure?
Will the security of my system break if I add a new component?
SSL/TLS and other standard protocols do not work in my scenario. How can I find ways to achieve security in my system efficiently?
How can I make sure the implementation adheres to the design?
Finding answers to these questions is essential to building secure, efficient systems; however, the complexity, subtlety, and interactions among different components in a large system put the problem beyond the reach of even experienced security experts, not to mention average programmers who lack security expertise. As a result, the current design and implementation process for secure systems is slow, expensive, and often results in a vulnerable system.
In my thesis, I propose a new automatic approach for building security protocols. In particular, I designed and built a suite of automatic tools, Athena, containing three components: 1) APV: an Automatic Protocol Analyzer; 2) APG: an Automatic Protocol Generator; 3) ACG: an Automatic Code Generator. In this talk, I'll discuss how this toolkit enables a new automatic approach for building security protocols that is more efficient, economical, and with higher security guarantee than the current approach.
Date and Time
Wednesday March 27, 2002 4:00pm -
5:30pm
Location
Computer Science Small Auditorium (Room 105)
Event Type
Speaker
Dawn Song, from UC Berkeley
Host
David Walker